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  48 
Abstract 49 
There is much debate about how humans’ decision-making compares to that of other 50 
primates.  One way to explore this is to compare species’ performance using identical 51 
methodologies in games with strategic interactions.  We presented a computerized Assurance 52 
Game, which was either functionally simultaneous or sequential, to investigate how humans, 53 
rhesus monkeys, and capuchin monkeys utilized information in decision-making.  All species 54 
coordinated via sequential play on the payoff-dominant Nash equilibrium, indicating that 55 
information about the partner’s choice improved decisions.  Furthermore, some humans and 56 
rhesus monkeys found the payoff-dominant Nash equilibrium in the simultaneous game, even 57 
when it was the first condition presented.   Thus, Old World primates solved the task without any 58 
external cues to their partner’s choice.  Finally, when not explicitly prohibited, humans 59 
spontaneously used language to coordinate on the payoff-dominant Nash equilibrium, indicating 60 
an alternate mechanism for converting a simultaneous move game into a sequential move game.  61 
This phylogenetic distribution implies that no single mechanism drives coordination decisions 62 
across the primates, while humans’ ability to spontaneously use language to change the structure 63 
of the game emphasizes that multiple mechanisms may be used even within the same species.  64 
These results provide insight into the evolution of decision-making strategies across the 65 
primates. 66 
67 
 68 
Introduction 69 
Along with the dispositions to trust and reciprocate and the propensity to exchange, the 70 
human ability to coordinate activities is a pillar upon which the flourishing of the species is built. 71 
The ability of two individuals to coordinate, literally to mutually arrange, an activity presupposes 72 
firstly that two individuals cognize that the outcomes of their actions are interdependent.  73 
Secondly, successful coordination assumes a shared attention and agreement on the ends to be 74 
achieved by mutually arranging a pair’s activities.  Within the Pleistocene tribe or the modern 75 
small group of family, friends and neighbors, these conditions are almost trivially met as 76 
personally known individuals share the habits, knowledge, and beliefs about the methods and 77 
possibilities necessary to coordinate successfully.  But what happens when modern strangers face 78 
a novel task of playing a simple 2 x 2 normal form game of coordination?  How well can the 79 
personally unknown extend to each other the assumptions of interdependent decisions and 80 
agreement on the ends?  As van Huyck et al. (1990) suggested, not as robustly as we might 81 
hubristically expect.  The question then becomes more interesting when posed of our primate 82 
relatives.  Do we share the ability to cognize actions as interdependent and to share attention on 83 
the ends achieved?     84 
There is little research addressing the question, but what there is indicates that several 85 
primates may share these abilities with humans.  For instance, in one Ultimatum game study with 86 
chimpanzees (Jensen et al. 2007), the apes’ decisions were dissimilar from human-typical 87 
behavior (Camerer 2003).  However a subsequent study found that the protocol designed for 88 
chimpanzees led to a similar outcome in humans (Smith & Silberberg 2010).  Our previous work 89 
investigated the Assurance game, which is a well-known model of social interactions (Skyrms 90 
2003).  We found that while humans found payoff dominant outcomes more readily than did 91 
either capuchin monkeys or chimpanzees, pairs of all species were able to find these outcomes, 92 
indicating that selection has favored similar outcomes (if not similar cognitive mechanisms) 93 
across these three primates (Brosnan et al. 2011).  Moreover, we found that chimpanzees with 94 
greater experience in cognitive testing found the payoff dominant outcome far more readily than 95 
did chimpanzees with little or no cognitive testing experience, indicating that, as with humans, 96 
experience may play a role in outcomes.   97 
For the current study, we chose to investigate the Assurance Game using a computerized 98 
methodology.  This provided a number of advantages for further research.  First, there is a long 99 
history in comparative research suggesting that the format in which one presents the same kind 100 
of task to nonhuman animals can have radical effects on performance.  For example, spatial 101 
discontiguity between response loci and stimuli was recognized as an obstacle to learning in 102 
animals (e.g., McCleam & Harlow 1954; Murphy & Miller 1959; Stollnitz & Schrier 1962).  103 
However, training primates to use a joystick gets past that problem of discontiguity and produces 104 
markedly different patterns of results (see Beran et al. 2007; Rumbaugh et al. 1989), and the 105 
same may be true for performance in economic games.  Thus, comparing our previous results to 106 
those from a computer task may help to highlight factors which affect decision-making. 107 
Another advantage of a computerized task is the abundance of data with respect to other 108 
cognitive abilities which are relevant.  This allows us to not only consider a priori whether 109 
species might be able to solve the task, but if our predictions are proven false to re-consider how 110 
the subjects might perceive the game.  Considering cognitive mechanisms, success in the game 111 
seems to require, at minimum, an ability to respond flexibly (e.g., contingent upon one’s 112 
partner’s decisions) and, related to this, an ability to inhibit (e.g., avoid the temptation of a large 113 
short-term payoff).  Considering first the role of phylogenetically widespread learning 114 
mechanisms, a number of primate species, including the rhesus monkeys and capuchin monkeys 115 
who participated in the current study, have shown substantial behavioral flexibility in responding 116 
to game-like tasks presented on computer screens.  These include tasks that involve behavioral 117 
inhibition, tracking of relative rates of reward for different responses, and even information-118 
seeking behavior (Beran et al. 2011; Beran et al. 2008; Evans 2007; Flemming et al. 2011).  119 
These skills, along with the monkeys’ clear interest in maximizing their food intake during these 120 
tasks, indicate that comparative assessments of cooperation using computer tasks are likely to 121 
provide the most compelling data for understanding the emergence of cooperation in humans.   122 
However, despite equivalent performance on basic learning tasks (e.g., two choice 123 
discrimination and learning set tasks), not all primates are equally adept at performing higher-124 
level cognitive tasks.  Relevant to this task, rhesus monkeys, but not capuchin monkeys, show 125 
evidence for metacognitive monitoring during psychophysical judgment tasks (Beran et al. 2009) 126 
and information-seeking paradigms (Beran & Smith 2011).  Thus suggests a species difference in 127 
monitoring ongoing performance.  Thus emerges a potentially important way to determine which 128 
cognitive mechanisms are important; it is possible that rhesus and capuchins would do equally 129 
well on games of coordination where contingencies for responses are clearly presented, that is, in 130 
a situation similar to a basic learning task, while diverging in performance when immediate cues 131 
are not present.  Finally, it is possible, although we think unlikely, that even higher-order 132 
cognitive mechanisms are involved, such as theory of mind, which could be activated in this case 133 
due to the social nature of the task.  If this is the case, we expect humans to outperform the other 134 
species (Penn & Povinelli 2007), despite some basic perspective abilities which have been seen 135 
in rhesus monkeys (Flombaum & Santos 2005).  Thus, testing these species on the Assurance 136 
game may shed light on not only performance levels, per se, on the game, but also the nature of 137 
the game itself from the perspective of the individuals playing it.     138 
To explore these issues in more detail, we here investigated the role of information in 139 
coordination decisions amongst three primate species, humans (Homo sapiens), rhesus monkeys 140 
(Macaca mulatta), and capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella). We re-designed the typical, normal-141 
form (NFG) Assurance Game methodology (Cooper et al. 2003; Ochs 1995; Smith 1982; van 142 
Huyck et al. 1990) specifically to work across species, holding the methodology as constant as 143 
possible (see Methods for details). We had two hypotheses for the current work.  First, based on 144 
our prior results with the exchange version of the task, we expected all species to be capable of 145 
successfully navigating the task, but we predicted that a higher percentage of human pairs would 146 
find the payoff dominant outcome as compared to the monkey species.  Our second hypothesis 147 
was that outcomes would change as the task parameters varied.  Specifically we predicted that if 148 
pairs could see each other’s choices prior to making a decision, the task could be solved by a 149 
cognitively simpler matching rule, meaning that all species would perform equally well.  On the 150 
other hand, we predicted that in the situation in which their partners’ choices were not available, 151 
higher-order mechanisms might be required, separating the species based on their aptitude at the 152 
tests of cognitive abilities we proposed above as relevant to this task, that is, humans performing 153 
better than the other primates. 154 
 155 
Methods 156 
General Methods 157 
The Assurance Game 158 
The game we used was a common game of coordination called the Assurance Game, 159 
sometimes referred to as the Stag Hunt game. The reward structure was such that mutual Stag 160 
play was the most beneficial (4 units), mutual Hare resulted in a low payoff (1 unit each), and 161 
the uncoordinated payoff of playing Stag when one’s partner plays Hare was unrewarded, while 162 
the individual who played Hare received 1 unit.   This game has two pure strategy Nash 163 
equilibria: (Stag-Stag), which is the payoff dominant equilibrium (the outcome that maximizes 164 
payoff to both individuals), and (Hare-Hare), the outcome which is payoff dominated. This well-165 
known coordination game is interesting to economists because strategic uncertainty plays a key 166 
role in the selection of the equilibrium, yet the players’ objectives are aligned (for a summary see 167 
Ochs 1995).  In the Assurance game, the objectives may be the same (Stag, Stag), but the 168 
question of strategic interest is how sure a given player is that the other player will play Stag 169 
when he or she plays Stag2. Evidence from coordination game experiments with humans indicate 170 
that the payoff dominant equilibrium is not a focal point with repeated interactions as in (van 171 
Huyck et al. 1990) , or with anonymous play with different individuals as in (Cooper et al. 172 
1990)1. 173 
We explicitly incorporated a number of features common to non-human studies but 174 
different from traditional NFG experiments with humans to facilitate cross-species comparisons.    175 
First, subjects received no verbal instruction or pre-testing so that individuals had to discover the 176 
payoff structure during the course of the game (note that there were only two options from which 177 
to choose, and thus four possible outcomes).  Second, all subjects, including humans, had 178 
participated in other experiments in the laboratory prior to this study so they were aware that 179 
decisions would result in tangible rewards (e.g. food or cash).  Third, subjects were paid on a 180 
                                                          
1 Though we should note that the former experiment involves more than two players with more than two potential 
actions, and the latter experiment uses a 3 x 3 coordination experiment. 
trial-by-trial basis, in case the immediacy of receiving rewards on each trial affected behavior. 181 
Fourth, for most treatments (see exception, below), subjects sat directly next to one another and 182 
were not anonymous, so subjects could potentially communicate (Brosig 2002; Fetchenhauer et 183 
al. 2010; we saw no attempts to communicate between the primates). Fifth, neither humans nor 184 
rhesus monkeys received any pre-tests designed to assess Assurance game understanding, so all 185 
subjects, including humans, had to discover the payoff structure during the course of the game. 186 
Capuchins had previously participated in an exchange-based version of the task (Brosnan et al. 187 
2011), but had no additional training.  Finally, we manipulated whether or not they could see 188 
their partners’ decisions to investigate how information affected decision-making.  189 
General computerized design 190 
Decisions were made by choosing one of two icons on each side of a split computer 191 
screen, one of which represented Stag (a red square) and one of which represented Hare (a blue 192 
circle). Icons were presented in a vertical distribution, with the order of presentation randomized 193 
both across trials and across individuals within the same trial.  Subjects of all species made a 194 
choice using a joystick.  We chose to study their behavior as naturally as possible, and so did not 195 
constrain the order of play or the timing of decisions. Once both subjects had made a choice, 196 
each subject received (or not) rewards dependent upon both what they chose and what their 197 
partner chose, following the payoff structure of the assurance experiment. 198 
There were two conditions, Synchronous, in which subjects did not know what their 199 
partner had chosen until both choices were complete, and Asynchronous, in which decisions 200 
were revealed as they were made (e.g., subjects potentially had information about their partners’ 201 
responses).  To block any information transfer in the Synchronous condition, the joystick itself 202 
was occluded and the cursor did not move; when they joystick was manipulated, both options 203 
and the cursor disappeared simultaneously, and both subjects’ choices were displayed 204 
simultaneously once both decisions had been made.  Thus it was, to our knowledge, impossible 205 
to determine the partner’s behavior by observation in this procedure, other than knowing that 206 
their partner had made a choice. In the Asynchronous game, the procedure was identical, except 207 
that choices were displayed as they were made, so that their partner could see their choice and 208 
potentially use the information when making their decision.   209 
Non-human primates 210 
All non-human primates were socially housed at the Language Research Center of 211 
Georgia State University.  Rhesus monkeys were all adult males who were moved to a specially 212 
designed paired testing area.  Capuchin monkeys were socially housed in multi-male, multi-213 
female social arrangements and voluntarily separated in an adjacent cage for testing, to limit 214 
distractions.  Only adults were tested with members of their social group, and in multiple 215 
pairings from within the same social group whenever possible.  No individual was ever food or 216 
water deprived for testing.  During test sessions, pairs did not always finish a trial block, and 217 
pairs completed different numbers of blocks during each testing session.  Thus the number of 218 
trials varied across both pairs and sessions.   219 
The capuchins and the rhesus monkeys were used to somewhat different testing 220 
schedules, so to avoid changing their schedules and causing unnecessary stress, we initially 221 
proceeded using their typical schedules.  Rhesus monkeys were given 6 hour testing sessions 222 
consisting of 60-trial blocks with a 30 minute interval between blocks.  Pairs could complete as 223 
many trial blocks as they chose.  Capuchins were initially given a single 40-trial session per day, 224 
as per their norm, but of four pairs, only one achieved the Stag-Stag outcome in the 225 
Asynchronous version, and even this pair did not maintain it.  We then implemented a more 226 
rhesus-like schedule, except with two hour test sessions (they became agitated if left in their 227 
testing cages for any longer), at which point all reached the Stag-Stag outcome. For more detail, 228 
see SOM. 229 
The non-human primates did require some training to learn to use the split screen (a 230 
novel experimental feature) and to make choices within the same time frame.  This occurred 231 
through a two-stage training process.  First, two monkeys worked together to learn that they had 232 
to both hit a single, solitary target on their side of the screen before both would receive a food 233 
pellet.  Then, they had to progress to a point where they would make those same responses 234 
within a 5 second window from the initial presentation of a trial.  Note that these training stimuli 235 
were not those used in the Assurance game, and there was no choice behavior on the part of the 236 
primates.  There was only one icon on the computer screen which could be contacted with the 237 
cursor.  This training was used to teach them which half of the screen presented their choices 238 
(and outcomes), and to teach them that they needed to respond relatively quickly when a trial 239 
was presented.   This training assured that, at minimum, subjects knew that 1) rewards were not 240 
given without both individuals making a response and 2) they could control only their cursor.  241 
Although of course we cannot know how the monkeys actually interpreted the task, we do know 242 
they at least understood how to generate responses that might bring rewards, and what 243 
limitations had been imposed. 244 
 Capuchin monkeys Based on our previous research (Brosnan et al. 2011) , we knew that 245 
the capuchins would have more difficulty with the task than did the humans.  Thus, we started all 246 
capuchins with the Asynchronous version of the task, and once they had learned it, gave them the 247 
Synchronous version.  The subjects had far more difficulty with this, so to verify that they were 248 
still able to do the basic task, we repeated the Asynchronous version.  Finally, we repeated the 249 
Synchronous version to see if the extensive experience had increased their skill level. 250 
Rhesus monkeys  Half of the rhesus monkeys were started on the Synchronous and half 251 
with the Asynchronous version.  All of the subjects on the Synchronous version succeeded, and 252 
so we did not return them to the Asynchronous version (see Results and Table 2).  Subjects that 253 
started on the Asynchronous version were subsequently run on the Synchronous version. 254 
Humans 255 
Undergraduate subjects were recruited from the general student body at Chapman 256 
University, Orange, CA, USA. Subjects were randomly recruited via an electronic email system 257 
and paid $7 for showing up on time, plus what they earned in the experiment. Each subject had 258 
participated in at least one economic experiment sometime prior to this session (participating in a 259 
previous study involving Normal Form game experiments or the Assurance Game disqualified 260 
individuals as a participant) so that they had experience with receiving actual payment for their 261 
decisions in this laboratory. No subject participated in more than one pairing or more than one 262 
version of the task. 263 
The humans’ only instruction the Synchronous treatment was limited to the following six 264 
points:  265 
1) Have you participated in an economic experiment before? 266 
(Both must reply with a “yes” to participate.) 267 
2) In this experiment you will be making decisions using a joystick attached to a computer.  268 
Use the left thumb pad to make a decision. 269 
3) As the experiment progresses you may be paid in quarters by the machines next to your 270 
computer. 271 
4) Please collect the coins in the yellow cups provided so as to not clog up the machines. 272 
5) These are the only instructions you will receive in the experiment.  Once the experiment 273 
begins, the experimenter will not be allowed to answer any questions until the experiment 274 
is over. 275 
6) Do you have any questions before the experiment begins? 276 
Subjects initially began with the Synchronous task, as described above.  Pairs of 277 
participants, who were the only two individuals in the room, sat next to one another at a single 278 
computer and used a joystick.  The lack of anonymity enhances the likelihood of achieving the 279 
Pareto dominant outcome. Pairs received payment in quarters (from a coin dispenser, an 280 
analogue to the primates’ pellet dispenser) and payoffs were in the same ratios as those of the 281 
monkeys (accumulated coins were converted into large bills at the conclusion of the experiment).  282 
However, the results of this game indicated that language was an important characteristic in 283 
determining the pairs’ outcomes (see Results for details), thus a true comparison between the 284 
conditions could not be done.  While we could have simply asked participants not to talk with 285 
each other during the game, this differed from the other primates, who could communicate to the 286 
fullest extent of their abilities, and may have led to an awkward social environment.  Thus, we 287 
instead investigated the Synchronous/Asynchronous comparison using an alternate procedure. 288 
This procedure was based on a typical Normal Form Game (NFG) procedure with a 2 x 2 289 
matrix of payoffs and strategies.  For the NFG treatments, the game and payoffs were the same, 290 
however participants were isolated at individual study carrels playing on their own computer 291 
against an anonymous opponent drawn from amongst the other participants in the room.  To hide 292 
who was partnered with whom, rewards accumulated and were paid out at the end of the session, 293 
rather than using a coin dispenser after each decision (the noise from coin dispensers would have 294 
served as a cue).  As with the monkeys, in the NFG Synchronous version, both partners’ choices 295 
were displayed simultaneously to both players after both decisions had been made, while in the 296 
NFG Asynchronous version choices were displayed to both players as they were made.  As an 297 
additional benefit, having results in a traditional NFG procedure allowed us to see how our 298 
Synchronous results with humans compared to typical NFG experimental procedures (e.g. 299 
involving instruction).   300 
Synchronous version  301 
Fifty-two undergraduate subjects participated in the study in pairs (i.e., in 26 separate 302 
sessions).   303 
NFG Synchronous and NFG Asynchronous versions  304 
 One hundred eighteen undergraduate subjects were recruited by the same protocols 305 
above, except that 12-24 people participated at the same time.  Fifty-eight people in three 306 
sessions of 22, 24, and 12 participated in the NFG Synchronous treatment and 60 people in three 307 
sessions of 24, 24, and 12 participated in the NFG Asynchronous treatment.  The subjects were 308 
simultaneously seated in a computer laboratory at visually-isolated carrels and instructed not to 309 
talk to one another.  They then read self-paced instructions on how to participate in the 310 
experiment.  These subjects were privately paid their total accumulated earnings at the 311 
conclusion of the experiment; they did not receive payment as they made each decision to avoid 312 
possible cuing to one’s partner’s identity. 313 
Statistics 314 
 Statistics are non-parametric due to small sample sizes.  Primate results are based on 315 
individual analyses, while for humans we include both individual analyses and inferential 316 
statistics that allow generalizations about the population.  This difference in approach is because 317 
fewer monkeys were available for the study, as few are sufficiently well trained for computerized 318 
testing. All statistics are two-tailed.   319 
Note that in many cases both chi-square and Fisher’s exact tests were impossible due to 320 
the large number of cells with zero values.  Thus, to determine whether a pair showed a pattern 321 
in their decision-making, we considered it meaningful if the subject showed an 80% or greater 322 
preference for one of the four options (for the pair; chance was actually 25% in this case) or one 323 
of the two options (for the individual; chance is 50%).  This percentage is significant for a 324 
binomial test for 20 trials and, as all of our subjects had at least 40 trials (and for pairs, chance 325 
was 25%, not 50%), this represented a conservative estimate for what constituted a significant 326 
pattern to their decision-making. 327 
 328 
Results  329 
Non-human primate results 330 
Both monkey species did very well in the Asynchronous task.  All capuchins began with 331 
the Asynchronous version due to previous results indicating that they would have trouble finding 332 
the payoff dominant outcome (Brosnan et al. 2011).  One pair reached the payoff-dominant 333 
outcome in our initial 40-trial sessions and the other three did so when switched to 60-trial 334 
sessions (see Methods, above).  Three of the rhesus monkey pairs (composed of four unique 335 
individuals) first played the Asynchronous game.  Two reached the 80% Stag-Stag criterion 336 
within a single session (see Table 2) and the third pair did so in the second session. 337 
Despite this similarity, the monkeys differed in their outcomes in the Synchronous task.  338 
None of the capuchin pairings showed any preference for playing Stag-Stag (or any other 339 
outcome) when tested in a novel pairing on the Synchronous task.  To see if this was due to a 340 
lack of understanding of the task, we re-ran the Asynchronous version with the capuchins.  Eight 341 
monkeys were paired in multiple pairings (range: 1-3; see Table 1) for a single session consisting 342 
of as many trials as they chose to complete in 2 hours (mean=253 trials).  All but one pair chose 343 
Stag-Stag at least 80% of the time (range: 80.6%-96.1%; see Table 1) and the exceptional pair 344 
chose Stag-Stag 71% of the time.  Nonetheless, when retested on the Synchronous task, 345 
outcomes remained poor.  Stag-Stag was maintained in only one of the five pairs which had been 346 
tested together previously (see Table 1).  Intriguingly, the exceptional pair showed the lowest 347 
frequency of Stag-Stag outcomes in the Asynchronous test, and the pair which had not previously 348 
been tested together also most often played the Stag-Stag outcome (see Table 1).  Note that 349 
capuchins’ poor performance occurred despite both previous experience with the Assurance 350 
game and introductory experience in the presumably easier Asynchronous version of the game. 351 
On the other hand, the two pairs of rhesus monkeys that were tested first on the 352 
Synchronous version quickly found the Stag-Stag outcome.  Although it took them slightly 353 
longer to reach the 80% criterion than did the pairs that played the Asynchronous version first, 354 
both pairs did so within 4 trial blocks, and at the same frequency as those pairs which first played 355 
the Asynchronous version (see Table 2).  Note that they accomplished this despite never having 356 
had the opportunity to match a partner’s play after having seen it, ruling out this simple 357 
associative mechanism.   358 
Finally, the two rhesus pairs which showed the highest frequency of Stag-Stag choices in 359 
the Asynchronous game were subsequently given the opportunity to play the Synchronous 360 
version.  One pair maintained a preference for playing Stag-Stag, while the other started at a 361 
lower level of Stag-Stag choices and subsequently declined further.  This seemed to be primarily 362 
due to one individual who began preferentially choosing Hare.  Thus, unlike with the capuchins, 363 
at least one pair was able to maintain the Stag-Stag outcome when switched to the Synchronous 364 
task.   365 
Human Results 366 
Among 27 human pairs in the Synchronous condition, 22 ultimately settled on Stag-Stag 367 
and 5 settled on Hare-Hare.  What was notable was the perfect correlation between outcomes 368 
and pairs’ discussions.  Although all pairs spoke to each other, textual analysis of video 369 
recordings revealed that not every pair spoke about the game. Amongst the 5 pairs who settled 370 
on Hare-Hare (range: 34-36 Hare-Hare choices in 40 trials; see Table 3), not a single pair spoke 371 
about the game (henceforth, non-communicators), while among the 22 pairs who did so 372 
(henceforth, communicators), every pair ultimately settled on Stag-Stag, choosing it in at least 373 
seven of the last 10 choices (13 pairs did so on every one of these choices).  One-third of 374 
communicators chose Stag-Stag a minimum of 80% of the time overall (range: 32-39 Stag-Stag 375 
choices) and more than half (55%) did so at least 70% of the time.  No non-communicators ever 376 
played Stag-Stag, indicating that they did not explore the decision space as thoroughly as did the 377 
other pairs (or the monkeys). 378 
 Given the larger human sample size, we can consider variation using inferential statistics.  379 
The overall payoff between communicators and non-communicators differed by a factor of 3 380 
(Independent samples Mann-Whitney U test: p<0.001, mean±SE payoff per trial for pairs of 381 
communicators: $1.48±.08; non-communicators: $0.47±.002).  Moreover, among 382 
communicators, there was an increase in payoff between the first quartile and last quartile 383 
(Wilcoxon Signed-ranks test, p <0.001, quartile 1 mean±SE: $0.98±.11; quartile 4: $1.89±.03).  384 
On the other hand, among non-communicators, the payoffs increased across these quartiles only 385 
because the decrease in number of Stag choices stabilized payoffs at one quarter for each 386 
individual by the fourth quartile (Wilcoxon, p=0.039; quartile 1 mean±SE: $0.44±.01; quartile 2: 387 
$0.50±.00).  Thus, sociality is not synonymous with coordination; humans had to actually 388 
discuss the game in order to benefit from language.  Moreover, humans were not intrinsically 389 
better than the other primates at the Synchronous condition.  They appeared to use 390 
communication to turn the Synchronous game in to an asynchronous game, giving humans an 391 
additional mechanism for coordination. 392 
 Based on these results, humans played the NFG Synchronous and NFG Asynchronous 393 
versions using a more traditional normal-form game set-up that prohibited discussion (see 394 
Methods).  One third (10 of 30) of the pairs in the NFG Asynchronous game chose Stag-Stag at 395 
least 80% of the time.  Intriguingly, an additional four of these pairs chose Hare-Hare 80% or 396 
more (and one other did so 78% of the time), an outcome that we never saw in either of the 397 
monkey species.  This could indicate the non-human primates are more likely to explore the 398 
decision space than are humans, or that humans are more likely to persevere on responses that 399 
are rewarding. In the NFG Synchronous game, only four (14%) pairs chose Stag-Stag this often, 400 
while ten (35%) pairs chose Hare-Hare.  Thus the frequency of Stag-Stag and Hare-Hare 401 
choices flipped between the two conditions.   402 
Considering the data quantitatively, the overall payoffs do not differ between the games 403 
(Mann-Whitney, z=1.47, p=0.14), although there is a non-significant trend for the players in the 404 
NFG Asynchronous game to earn more by the fourth period than do players in the NFG 405 
Synchronous game (Mann-Whitney, z=1.85, p=0.0643).  Moreover, the number of Stag-Stag 406 
choices was greater in the NFG Asynchronous treatment than NFG Synchronous treatment 407 
(Mann-Whitney, z=1.9, p=0.0574), and twice as many partnerships failed to ever play Stag-Stag 408 
in the NFG Synchronous as compared to the NFG Asynchronous treatment (10/29 vs 5/30). 409 
Considering the games individually, participants showed a trend towards playing Stag-Stag more 410 
often than Hare-Hare in the NFG Asynchronous game (Wilcoxon, z=1.86, p=0.0624), but not 411 
the NFG Synchronous version (Wilcoxon, z=0.46, p=0.6818).  Subjects improved over the 412 
course of both treatments, earning more money in the fourth quartile than in the first (NFG 413 
Asynchronous: Wilcoxon, z=4.26, p<0.001, NFG Synchronous: z=3.42, p=0.0006).  Nonetheless, 414 
as with the other two primate species, humans were better at finding the payoff dominant 415 
outcome when an opportunity to coordinate was presented (e.g., sequential play). 416 
Finally, comparing humans’ results from the nonhuman primate format (which was the 417 
Synchronous treatment) to the NFG Synchronous format, the pairs’ payoffs were higher when 418 
they could talk (mean payoffs for the Synchronous treatment: $1.63; NFG Synchronous 419 
treatment: $1.07; Mann-Whitney, z=2.62, p=0.0087).  On the other hand, by the end of the game, 420 
subjects did equally well when they could see each other’s decision as it was made as when they 421 
could talk (comparing fourth quartile payoffs in the Synchronous and NFG Asynchronous 422 
treatments; Mann-Whitney, z=1.00, p =0.3179; see Table 3).  Thus, subjects were equally able to 423 
use language or sequential moves without language to coordinate on the Stag-Stag outcome and 424 
achieve the same level of payoffs across procedures.   425 
Does finding Stag-Stag mark a change in behavior? 426 
 The above results assess individuals’ tendency to find the cooperative, Stag-Stag, 427 
solution.  That is, to what degree do they explore the problem space and encounter Stag-Stag as 428 
an option?  A second way to consider these data is to determine the frequency with which they 429 
played stag-stag after having found it for the first time.  Considering first the monkeys, there is 430 
no evidence that finding Stag-Stag was sufficient to alter their behavior.  Amongst capuchins, no 431 
pair ever had a single trial block (60 trials) in which they did not play Stag-Stag at least once (see 432 
Supplemental Results for details), yet despite this not a single pair was able to successfully solve 433 
the Synchronous version of the task.  Rhesus similarly played Stag-Stag in every trial block, yet 434 
it was rare for a pair to settle on Stag-Stag before the third trial block (see Supplemental Results 435 
for details). 436 
 Humans showed a similar pattern.  In the Asynchronous task, most players who found 437 
Stag-Stag did so quickly (within the first 4 trials), yet only three (12%) of these pairs played 438 
nothing but Stag-Stag after finding it. In the Synchronous task, no pair ever exclusively played 439 
Stag-Stag after finding it (for details of both conditions, see Supplemental Methods). Thus we 440 
find clear indication that in neither of the two computerized conditions do pairs’ payoffs change 441 
meaningfully after finding the first Stag-Stag outcome, indicating that these results cannot be 442 
explained by a lack of knowledge about the payoff matrix. Similarly, sitting next to one’s partner 443 
did not affect the frequency with which individuals stayed on the Stag-Stag payoff.  Of the 22 444 
pairs that played Stag-Stag at some point, only one played nothing else after finding that 445 
outcome.  Four additional pairs played Stag-Stag all but one or two times, possibly indicating 446 
that they were either jointly exploring the parameter space, or individually exploring potentially 447 
increased outcomes (see Supplemental Results). 448 
 449 
Discussion 450 
Our results indicate that generalizing the decision-making outcomes of primates into one 451 
in which species are ‘better’ or ‘worse’ than others is not sufficiently nuanced.  Instead, we find 452 
that the results vary in interesting ways depending upon context.  Considering our second 453 
hypothesis first, all species were able to more easily solve the task in the Asynchronous than in 454 
the Synchronous conditions.  Although these studies were explicitly designed to investigate 455 
outcomes, not mechanism, we are able to use these results to posit necessary mechanisms.  Thus 456 
it seems likely that this boost in performance was due to the availability of simple rules, such as 457 
matching-to-sample (e.g., Cumming & Berryman 1961) which could not be used in the 458 
Synchronous task since the partner’s behavior was hidden.  This indicates that it is possible to 459 
solve this task with a suite of fairly simple behavioral mechanisms.  We also note that, without 460 
other data, this would indicate phylogenetic continuity amongst the primates, and thus, when 461 
considered with the Synchronous results, emphasizes the utility of using multiple methods to 462 
assess behavior and cognition. 463 
On the other hand, not all species were able to solve the Synchronous task.  No pair of 464 
capuchin monkeys ever solved this task, even after experience (successfully) solving the 465 
Asynchronous task.  Thus, the monkeys’ inability in the Synchronous pairing was not due to a 466 
failure to understand the task outcomes.  Instead, we think that the best explanation for the 467 
decline in performance in the Synchronous task is likely related to the fact that they could no 468 
longer see their partners’ decisions and use a simple strategy such as matching.  These results 469 
also imply that the one pair’s success in the previous, exchange version (Brosnan et al. 2011) 470 
was likely due to the fact that they could see their partners’ choices.  On the other hand, some 471 
rhesus monkeys and humans found the payoff dominant outcome in the Asynchronous task, and 472 
required very few trials in order to do so.  Thus, Old World primates outperformed New World 473 
primates, rather than humans outperforming nonhumans.   474 
This has several very important implications when considering the mechanisms required 475 
to solve the Assurance game.  First, of course, the task can be solved using fairly simple 476 
learning-based mechanisms when appropriate cues are available (e.g., the Asynchronous task).  477 
Second, the high performance of both rhesus and humans implies that the presence of theory of 478 
mind is not required.  Although one can see how the ability to predict one’s partners’ behavior 479 
would be useful, it seems the task can be solved without it.  It will be interesting to see whether 480 
this remains true in more complex games which lack a mutually beneficially payoff dominant 481 
outcome.  Finally, in the absence of cues, it seems likely that other more complex cognitive 482 
abilities are required to solve the task.  We note that these results are particularly strong given to 483 
our choice of a New World monkey species.  Capuchins have an unusually large (for a monkey) 484 
brain-to-body ratio (Rilling & Insel 1999),  a general high ability in cooperative tasks (e.g., de 485 
Waal & Berger 2000; Mendres & de Waal 2000), and equal rhesus in many learning tasks (see 486 
Introduction).  Any of these might have led to the prediction that capuchins would cluster with 487 
the Old World monkeys, even if uniquely amongst New World primates.  On the other hand, 488 
despite the capuchins’ apparent advantages (for solving this task) over other New World 489 
monkeys, cognitive differences favoring rhesus monkeys over capuchins have been seen in other 490 
recent tasks involving higher-order cognitive abilities, such as metacognition (Beran et al. 2009; 491 
Hampton 2001).   492 
 Our final intriguing result is that outcomes in these games, and in particular the 493 
inefficiencies in decision-making, were based on an inability to coordinate on the payoff-494 
dominant outcome, not an inability to locate it due to a lack of exploration of the problem space.  495 
None of our subjects, including humans, immediately reverted to the payoff dominant choice 496 
after having first experienced it.  This was true whether they could or could not see their 497 
partners’ choice when it was made or, in the case of humans, whether or not they could talk to 498 
their partner.  This observation is clearly contrary to what would be expected if finding the 499 
payoff dominant solution is the only thing required to solve this game.  Moreover, this result 500 
indicates that there are really two aspects involved in successful performance. First is exploring 501 
the parameter space, and locating the payoff dominant outcome.  In this, we saw great variability 502 
within each species, as indicated in our analysis of their overall results.  Second is the ability of 503 
pairs to coordinate on that outcome once they have found it.  This is explored in our analysis of 504 
the choices following the first Stag-Stag play.  The data indicate that both of these aspects of the 505 
Assurance game present challenges to all three species; obviously individuals who do not fully 506 
explore the parameter space may never find the payoff dominant outcome, but even after this has 507 
been found, coordination is not assured. 508 
While we are strongly in favor of testing additional primates (and non-primates) of all 509 
taxa, given these data we predict that evidence will continue to favor a New World/Old World 510 
split in decision-making outcomes.  We are also enthusiastic to see how the inclusion of different 511 
game features which may require other abilities, such as theory of mind, will affect species’ play.  512 
We predict that such studies will serve to illuminate not only the phylogeny of decision-making, 513 
but also the cognitive requirements of different decision-making situations, as illustrated by 514 
various economic games.  In particular, some rhesus monkeys were notable for their success, a 515 
pattern of results which clearly deserve additional investigation.  One possibility for 516 
investigating these mechanisms is to see whether humans and rhesus monkeys differ in the 517 
flexibility with which they can switch between strategies.  This question is more than academic; 518 
if humans and rhesus monkeys are using similar mechanisms (e.g., a cognitive homology), then 519 
we know that humans’ abilities are built on shared foundation that extends back at least as far as 520 
the split with Old World monkeys.  On the other hand, if humans and rhesus monkeys have 521 
converged on similar outcomes despite using different cognitive mechanisms to reach those 522 
outcomes, then we can begin to investigate what shared social or ecological factors in humans’ 523 
and rhesus’ environments selected for these outcomes.   524 
Finally, uniquely among the primates, language is an important mechanism for solving 525 
coordination tasks in humans, much as additional information was used by all species in the 526 
Asynchronous task.  In other words, we hypothesize that humans may use communication to 527 
transform a Synchronous task into an Asynchronous one by providing information about future 528 
moves.  This may indicate that some underlying mechanisms, such as the ability to increase 529 
performance when cues are present, are conserved between humans and other primates, albeit 530 
with differing specific mechanisms.  We also think the most likely explanation for the humans 531 
who did not communicate about, and thus did not solve, the task is not that they were incapable 532 
of doing so.  Even subjects who did not solve the task spoke to one another.  Instead we propose 533 
that they thought that they had solved the task, did not see the necessity of exploring other 534 
options, and so did not converse about it.  Future research aimed at determining which factors 535 
cause these different reactions may help to clarify both individual (e.g., personality) and 536 
contextual (e.g., social) factors which affect humans’ ability to coordinate in such situations. 537 
 The picture that is emerging makes it clear that humans are not alone in our ability to find 538 
efficient, pay-off maximizing outcomes in a coordination game.  Moreover, other species’ 539 
behaviors can be measured using the same experimental mechanisms common in humans, that is, 540 
economic games, and results can be made comparable when procedures are equalized across 541 
species, including humans.  Future work should be done to investigate how cognitive 542 
mechanisms interact with game structure, and whether there is homology in the underlying 543 
cognitive mechanisms or instead whether similar outcomes are reached in analogous ways.  544 
Finally, it will be interesting to see whether this similarity in outcome remains in other more 545 
challenging decision-making situations. 546 
 547 
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Table Captions 
Table 1: Comparing the capuchin pairs’ performance on the second asynchronous and synchronous games (note some pairs had 
previous experience on both the asynchronous and synchronous games; see Results for details). 
 
 Asynchronous Game (second) Synchronous Game (second) 
Overall First Session Second Session 
Pairings % Stag-Stag # trials 
(1 session) 
% Stag-Stag # 
sessions/trials 
% Stag-Stag # trials 
(1 session) 
% Stag-Stag # trials 
(1 session) 
Drella Wren 80.6 201  
Griffin Drella 93.0 196  
Griffin Wren 96.1 360 33.1 8/3042 34 300 24.2 355 
Lily Wren 85.2 240 38.9 7/2176 81.1 180 43.8 420 
Griffin Lily 81.7 68 28.4 6/2864 36.1 540 36.7 414 
Liam Logan 71.3 240 78.1 6/1467 88.2 170 93.1 29 
Logan Gabe 89.2 240  
Nala Logan 93.5 420 34.6 5/2260 74.2 360 31.4 420 
Nala Liam  60.1 4/1437 78.3 300 64.0 417 
   
 
 
Table 2: Comparing rhesus performance by trial.  
 Game Overall % Stag-Stag 
% Stag-Stag # 
sessions/trials 
Session 1 Session 2 Session 3 Session 4 Session 5 
Obi Han Asynchronous 74.6 5/1483 53.7 77.9 84.6 76.7 81.0 
Luke Obi Asynchronous 94.5 5/1876 90.9 95.3 96.1 93.9 96.4 
Synchronous 65.7 2/824 76.7 54.8  
Chewey Han* Asynchronous 87.8 5/1440 85 94.2 85.3 87.2 87.3 
Synchronous 72.2 3/360 66.7 68.8 81.3  
Hank Gale Synchronous 84.0 2/720 74.5 93.4  
Willie Murph Synchronous 88.1 3/472 31.6^ 81.3 95.7  
*Both pairs which played both games played Asynchronous first, followed by synchronous.   
^This represented only a single trial block; in actuality Willie and Murph reached 90% Stag-Stag preference in their third trial block, which was in 
their second session.  Hank and Gale did not reach 90% until their fifth trial block, which was in their first session. 
 
Table 3: Human preferences across the three games.  Earnings measure the mean earnings per trial for the pair, and so range from 
0.25 (one individual earned a quarter from playing Hare and their partner earned nothing from playing Stag) to 2.0 (both earned a 
dollar from playing Stag).  An average of 0.5 means that both played Hare on every trial.  A mean of 1.825 indicates a single Hare 
play and a mean of 1.85 indicates a single Hare-Hare trial.  
 
 Talking? Spoke about 
symbols? 
Number of 
pairs 
Number of 
trials 
Ever played 
Stag-Stag 
Mean # 
Stag-Stag 
Mean # 
Hare-Hare 
Mean Q1 
earnings 
Mean Q4 
earnings 
Paired Yes Yes 22 40 ALL 27.7 (69%) 6.2 0.98 1.89 
Yes No 5 40 NONE 0 (0%) 35.2 0.44 0.5 
Synchronous No  30 40 25 (83%) 20.27 (51%) 10.83 0.93 1.43 
Asynchronous No  29 40 19 (66%) 13.48 (34%) 16.28 0.77 1.07 
 
SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL 
Brosnan, Wilson & Beran 
 
Supplemental Methods 
Non-human primate housing details 
All non-human primates were socially housed at the Language Research Center of 
Georgia State University.  Rhesus monkeys were all adult males, individually housed in rooms 
with 1 to 2 other individuals for testing and each spent time outside in various social 
arrangements. Rhesus monkeys were moved to a specially designed paired testing area where 
they could share a single monitor between the two subjects.  Capuchin monkeys were socially 
housed in multi-male, multi-female social arrangements with extensive indoor and outdoor living 
space complete with environmental enrichment.  All capuchins were adults who lived in the 
same social group and, when possible, multiple pairings within the same social group were 
tested. For testing, capuchin pairs were separated from the remainder of the social group into a 
testing cage located in the indoor colony room to limit distractions.  All separation was voluntary 
(i.e., subjects were only tested if they entered the testing area freely). Both species received a 
combination of primate chow, fruits, and vegetables as well as additional enrichment foods.   
 
Rhesus testing schedule 
Rhesus monkeys were given 6 hour testing sessions.  During these sessions, pairs could 
complete as many trial blocks as they chose.  Sessions consisted of 60-trial blocks with 30 
minute long intervals between each trial block during which the program was unavailable.   
 
Capuchin testing schedule 
Capuchins were initially given a single 40-trial session per day, which reflected their 
typical testing pattern and the general trend that they complete fewer daily trials than do rhesus 
monkeys.  However, only one of four unique pairs repeated achieved the Stag-Stag outcome in 
the Asynchronous version, and even this preference peaked at 67.5% and dropped off over the 
next 6 sessions to only 45% (not different from Hare-Stag at 40%).  At this point, we 
implemented a more rhesus-like schedule, except that their test sessions were only two hours 
long (they became agitated if left in their testing cages for longer than this amount of time). 
Using this longer format, all three showed a 90% preference Stag-Stag by their first (2 pairs) or 
third (1 pair) session. Given these results, 60 trial sessions were used throughout the remainder 
of the testing. 
 
Supplemental Results 
Does finding Stag-Stag mark a change in behavior? 
Of the four conditions for the capuchin monkeys, not a single pair ever had a single trial 
block (60 trials) in which they did not play Stag-Stag at least once (First trial block mean±SEM 
percent Stag-Stag choices, Asynchronous first time: 30.2±4.5, Asynchronous second time: 
78.8±4.6, Synchronous first time: 14.1±7.0, Synchronous second time: 58.3±10).  Thus for all 
test blocks (and sessions) following their first test block in the first Asynchronous condition, 
subjects had previously experience Stag-Stag, making it unlikely that the challenges the 
capuchins faced were due to not recognizing Stag-Stag as an option.  In fact, in their second 
Synchronous condition (that is, the fourth condition chronologically), the capuchins did 
significantly better on the first trial block than they did overall (overall mean: 45.58±4.0; 
Wilcoxon, T-=10, n=12, p=0.008), indicating that previous exposure to Stag-Stag was not 
sufficient for them to solve the task. 
 All pairs of rhesus monkeys played Stag-Stag during the first trial block (First trial block 
mean±SEM percent Stag-Stag choices. Asynchronous: 59.6±15.2, Synchronous: 41.7±8.4).  
Nonetheless, it was rare for pairs to reach 80% Stag-Stag outcomes in the next trial block 
(Asynchronous: mean=10, range = 1-28 trial blocks; Synchronous: mean=3, range = 2-5 trial 
blocks; note that the 80% criterion was reached more rapidly in the Synchronous condition, but 
no pair found it on the first trial block).  Thus simply having experience with the Stag-Stag 
outcome was insufficient to settle upon that strategy. 
 In the Asynchronous computerized task, 43% (13 pairs) of humans played Stag-Stag on 
their first move and 17% (5 pair) never played it (the remaining players averaged 4.5 trials, range 
2-17).  Of the pairs who found the Stag-Stag payoff, only three (12%) pairs subsequently played 
nothing but Stag-Stag after finding it.  In the Synchronous condition, 11 of 29 human pairs never 
played Stag-Stag, and only one pair (3%) played it on the first trial.  The remaining pairs found 
the Stag-Stag outcome in a mean of 3.8 trials (range 2-12).  No pair played nothing but Stag-Stag 
after finding it.  In fact, while the overall mean payoffs increased by definition when any trials 
prior to a Stag-Stag choice are excluded, the mean payoff increased from 1.14 to 1.19, a very 
modest increase (non-parametric statistics based on rank are, again by definition, significant, but 
we think meaningless in this case).  Thus we find clear indication that in neither of the two 
computerized conditions do pairs’ payoffs change meaningfully after finding the first Stag-Stag 
outcome, indicating that these results cannot be explained by a lack of knowledge about the 
payoff matrix. 
 The primate version of the human game produced the same general results.  Of the 22 
pairs that played Stag-Stag at some point, they found the Stag-Stag outcome in a mean of 6.7 
trials (range 1-32).  Only one pair played nothing but Stag-Stag after experiencing the outcome; 
the rest took a mean of 21.6 trials (range 3-39) to settle on all Stag-Stag choices.  Several pairs 
had only one or two non-Stag-Stag choices after finding the outcome, indicating that either one 
individual tried cheating (n=4) or they tried the Hare-Hare outcome, presumably after discussion 
(n=4; two pairs in both measures).  If these pairs are counted from the time they went mostly to 
Stag-Stag, then 5 pairs (all but one of them) immediately preferred Stag-Stag.  
 
